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Interplay Between Delayed CSIT and Network
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Zohaib Hassan Awan and Aydin Sezgin
Abstract
We study the problem of secure transmission over a Gaussian two-user multi-input single-output
(MISO) broadcast channel under the assumption that links connecting the transmitter to the two receivers
may have unequal strength statistically. In addition to this, the state of the channel to each receiver is
conveyed in a strictly causal manner to the transmitter. We focus on a two state topological setting
of strong v.s. weak links. Under these assumptions, we first consider the MISO wiretap channel and
establish bounds on generalized secure degrees of freedom (GSDoF). Next, we extend this model to the
two-user MISO broadcast channel and establish inner and outer bounds on GSDoF region with different
topology states. The encoding scheme sheds light on the usage of both resources, i.e., topology of the
model and strictly causal channel state information at the transmitter (CSIT); and, allows digitization and
multi-casting of overheard side information, while transmitting confidential message over the stronger
link. Furthermore, for a special class of channels, we show that the established bounds agree and so we
characterize the sum GSDoF.
I. INTRODUCTION
In communication networks, due to the scarcity of available resources and increase in the demand of
higher data rates imposed by the consumers, multiple nodes communicate with each other over a shared
medium. This in turn leads to a fundamental problem of interference in networks. A key ingredient to
eradicate the detrimental effect of interference efficiently is by means of CSIT. In existing literature, for
instance [2], different schemes are proposed which require perfect knowledge of CSIT to align or cancel
interference. In practice, wireless medium is exposed to various random effects; thus, conveying perfect
CSIT is difficult. Recently, in [3] Maddah-Ali et al. study a MISO broadcast channel and show a rather
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1surprising result that strictly causal (delayed) CSIT is still useful in the sense that it enlarges the degrees
of freedom (DoF) compared to a similar model with no CSIT. The model studied in [3] is generalized
to a variety of settings namely, two- and three-user multi-input multi-output (MIMO) broadcast channel
in [4], [5], two-user interference channel in [6], [7], and X-channel in [8], [9] all from DoF perspective.
In cellular networks due to mobility, communication links are subjected to different topological effects,
e.g., inter-cell interference, wave propagation path loss, jamming. These physical factors influence links
in an asymmetric manner, that lead to some links being stronger than others statistically. A fundamental
issue with DoF analysis is that it ignores the diversity of links strength and implicitly assumes that all
non-zero channels are equally strong in the sense that each link is capable of carrying 1 DoF, irrespective
of the magnitude of channel coefficients. The GDoF metric solves this limitation by taking diversity of
links strength into account [10], [11]. In [12], Chen et al. study a two-user MISO broadcast channel by
considering the two state topological setting of strong v.s. weak links and assume that CSI conveyed by
both receivers can vary over time. For this model the authors establish bounds on GDoF region.
As said before, due to the broadcast nature of wireless medium, communication can be over heard by
unintended nodes in the network. Wyner in [13], introduced a basic wiretap channel to study secrecy
by taking physical layer attributes of the channel into account. In Wyner’s setup, the source wants to
communicate a confidential message to the legitimate receiver and this message is meant to be concealed
from the eavesdropper. For the degraded setting, in which the channel to legitimate receiver is stronger then
to the eavesdropper secrecy capacity is established. In the last decade, the wiretap channel has attracted
significant interest in the research community and is extended to study a variety of multi-user channels,
e.g., the broadcast channel [14], [15], the multi-access channel [16]–[20], the relay channel [21]–[23], the
interference channel [24], [25], and the multi-antenna channel [26]–[29]. For a review of other related
contributions the reader may refer to [30] (and references therein). Due to the difficulty in characterizing
the complete secrecy capacity region, a number of recent contributions has focused on characterizing
the approximate capacity of these networks. The approximate capacity is measured by the notion of
secure degrees of freedom (SDoF). Similar to the model with no security constraints, the SDoF metric
captures the asymptotic behavior of secure data rates in high signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) regime. Thus,
SDoF can be equivalently understood as the secure spatial multiplexing gain, number of secure signaling
dimensions, or the secrecy capacity pre-log factor. From DoF perspective, the authors in [31] study a
K-user interference channel and establish a lower bound on the sum SDoF, where perfect non-causal CSI
is available at all nodes. Recently, Yang et al. in [32] study the two-user MIMO broadcast channel under
a relaxation that instead of non-causal CSI, strictly causal CSI (delayed) is provided to the transmitter
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Fig. 1. (2, 1, 1)–MISO broadcast channel, where the link power exponent to receiver 1 is A1 ∈ {1, α} and to receiver 2 is
A2 ∈ {1, α} and 0 ≤ α ≤ 1.
from both receivers. For this model the authors characterize the SDoF region. The coding scheme in [32]
follows by a careful extension of Maddah Ali-Tse scheme [3] with additional noise injection to account
for secrecy constraints. Zaidi et al. in [33], [34] study the two-user MIMO X-channel with asymmetric
feedback and delayed CSIT, and characterize the complete sum SDoF region. In [35], the authors studied
the MISO broadcast channel and assume that CSI conveyed by two receivers can vary over time and
establish bounds on SDoF region. Recall that, similar to DoF — SDoF metric ignores the diversity of
links strength at the receivers which may be beneficial to strengthen the secrecy in certain situations.
Thus, going beyond the SDoF metric to the GSDoF will be useful to gain further insights and is the
focus of this work.
In this paper, we consider a Gaussian (2, 1, 1)–MISO broadcast channel which consists of three nodes
— a transmitter and two receivers as shown in Figure 1. The transmitter is equipped with two antennas
and each receiver is equipped with a single antenna. The transmitter wants to reliably transmit message
W1 to the receiver 1 and message W2 to the receiver 2. In investigating this model we make three
assumptions, namely, 1) each receiver knows the perfect instantaneous CSI and also the CSI of the other
3receiver with a unit delay, 2) each receiver is allowed to convey the past or delayed CSI to the transmitter,
and 3) links connecting two receivers may have different strength, statistically. We restrict our attention
to the two state topological setting of stronger v.s. weaker links; thus, the topology of this network is
allowed to alternate between four possible states and is known at the transmitter. Furthermore, message
W1 intended for the receiver 1 is meant to be kept secret from the receiver 2 and message W2 intended
for the receiver 2 is meant to be kept secret from the receiver 1. Thus, each receiver plays two different
roles, not only 1) it acts as a legitimate receiver for the message intended for itself, 2) it also acts as
an eavesdropper for the message intended for the other receiver. We assume that the eavesdroppers are
passive and are not capable to modify the communication.
The MISO broadcast channel that we study in this paper relates to a number of works studied previously.
Compared to the MIMO broadcast channel with secrecy constraints studied in [32], in this work the links
connecting two receivers may observe different strength. The (2, 1, 1)–MISO broadcast channel that we
study can be seen as a special case of the one in [12] but with imposed security constraints. From a
practical viewpoint, the channel shown in Figure 1 may be useful to model the down-link phase of a
cellular network in which the base station wants to securely communicate with two receivers and the
messages are meant to be kept secret from each other — where both receivers are subjected to jamming
from an external interferer.
The main contributions of this work are summarized as follows. We first consider the (2, 1, 1)–MISO
wiretap channel and establish bounds on the GSDoF. Next, we extend the MISO wiretap model to the
broadcast setting with strictly causal (delayed) CSIT as shown in Figure 1. For this model, we first
establish an outer bound on the GSDoF region. The techniques used to establish the outer bound are
essentially similar to the one that we use to prove the upper bound for the wiretap model. Concentrating
on the role of topological diversity, we consider two elementary settings. In the first scenario, we consider
a setting in which the link to one receiver is comparatively stronger than the other. We refer to this as
fixed topology. In the second scenario, we consider the symmetric alternating topology. This setting refers
to the case in which the link to one receiver is stronger than to the other receiver, half of the duration of
communication time. For these two models, we establish inner bounds on the GSDoF region. The encoding
scheme is based on an appropriate extension of Maddah Ali scheme [3] with noise injection [32], and
carefully utilizes the topology of the network. The key ingredients of the coding scheme are, as opposed
to [3] where side information is conveyed in an analog manner, digitized side information is multicasted,
and in supplement to this, fresh confidential information is send to the receiver with the stronger link.
We also study a special class of (2, 1, 1)–MISO broadcast channel with integer channel coefficients.
4We first consider the MISO wiretap channel with fixed topology, where the link to legitimate receiver is
stronger than to the eavesdropper and characterize the GSDoF. The coding scheme in this case follows by
appropriately combining compute-and-forward scheme [36] and also uses some elements of the schemes
that we have previously developed for the general case. Next, we consider the (2, 1, 1)–MISO broadcast
channel with symmetric alternating topology and characterize the sum GSDoF. Furthermore, we specialize
our results for the case in which there are no security constraints. In particular, for the fixed topology
setting in which the link to one receiver is comparatively stronger than to the other, we characterize the
GDoF region. The coding scheme in this case follows by specializing the scheme that we have developed
previously for a related model by removing the secrecy constraints. Finally, we illustrate our results with
the help of some numerical examples.
We structure this paper as follows. Section II provides a formal description of the channel model along
with some useful definitions. In Section III, we consider the MISO wiretap channel and state the upper
and lower bounds on GSDoF. In Section IV, we study the MISO broadcast channel and state the outer
and inner bounds on the GSDoF region. In Section V, we specialize our results in previous sections to
integer channels. Section VI provides some numerical examples. Finally, in Section VII we conclude this
paper by summarizing its contributions.
Notations: A few words about notations. Boldface upper case letter X denote matrices, boldface lower
case letter x denote vectors, and calligraphic letter X designate alphabets. At each time instant t, xt denote
[xt1, . . . , xtn], and E[.] denote the expectation operator. We use
.
= to denote an exponential equality, such
that given f(ρ) .= ρβ implies lim
ρ→∞
log f(ρ)/ log(ρ) = β. We use O(f(ρ)) to denote the asymptotic
behaviour of the function f(ρ). The term o(n) is some function g(n) such that lim
n→∞
g(n)
n = 0. The
Gaussian distribution with mean µ and variance σ2 is denoted by CN (µ, σ2). Finally, throughout the
paper, logarithms are taken to base 2.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND DEFINITIONS
We consider a two-user (2, 1, 1)–Gaussian MISO broadcast channel, as shown in Figure 1. In this
model, the transmitter is equipped with two transmit antennas and each of the receiver is equipped with
a single antenna. The transmitter wants to reliably transmit message W1 ∈ W1 = {1, . . . , 2nR1(A1,ρ)}
to receiver 1, and message W2 ∈ W2 = {1, . . . , 2nR2(A2,ρ)} to receiver 2, respectively; and, in doing
so, it wishes to conceal the message W1, intended to receiver 1, from receiver 2 and the message W2,
intended to receiver 2, from receiver 1, respectively. Thus, receiver 2 not only is a legitimate receiver
for confidential message W2, it acts as an eavesdropper for the MISO channel to receiver 1. Similarly,
5receiver 1 not only is a legitimate receiver for confidential message W1, it is an eavesdropper for the
MISO channel to receiver 2. For this setting, we consider a fast fading environment and assume that
each receiver is fully aware of its own perfect instantaneous CSI and also the CSI of the other receiver
with a unit delay. In addition to this, each receiver is allowed to convey only the past or outdated CSI to
the transmitter, i.e., at time instant t, transmitter has perfect knowledge of only the past (t− 1) channel
states from both receivers. It is easy to see that by setting Wi = φ for i = 1 or 2, the model in Figure 1
reduces to the (2, 1, 1)–MISO wiretap channel.
Due to the inherent randomness of the wireless channel and topological changes that may arise, for
instance — due to the mobility of the users or interference (jamming) from unintended nodes, some
elements of the network can experience more interference compared to the others. These factors in
turn originate two fundamental classes of links, where few links are comparatively stronger than others
statistically. Let A1 ∈ {1, α} denote the link power exponent from the transmitter-to-receiver 1 and
A2 ∈ {1, α} denote the link power exponent from transmitter-to-receiver 2, respectively, for 0 ≤ α ≤ 1;
where we denote the stronger link by Ai := 1 and weaker link by Ai := α, i = 1, 2. As alluded before,
the notion of stronger v.s. weaker links implies a statistical comparison, so for instance, A1 > A2 refers
to the case in which link connecting the transmitter to receiver 1 is stronger than to the receiver 2
statistically. For convenience, without loss of generality in the rest of the paper, we will refer to this as
receiver 1 being stronger than receiver 2. Then, based on the topology of the network, the model that we
study belongs to any of the four possible states, (A1, A2) ∈ {1, α}2. We denote λA1A2 be the fraction of
time topology state (A1, A2) occurs, such that
∑
(A1,A2)∈{1,α}2
λA1A2 = 1. (1)
The channel input-output relationship at time instant t is then given by
yt =
√
ρA1,thtxt + n1t
zt =
√
ρA2,tgtxt + n2t, t = 1, . . . , n (2)
where x ∈ C2×1 is the channel input vector, h ∈ H ⊆ C1×2 is the channel vector connecting receiver
1 to the transmitter and g ∈ G ⊆ C1×2 is the channel vector connecting receiver 2 to the transmitter.
The parameter ρ is subject to input power constraint and the channel output noise ni is assumed to be
independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) white Gaussian noise, with ni ∼ CN (0, 1) for i = 1, 2. For
convenience, we normalize the channel input vector, ||xt||2 ≤ 1, then the average received signal-to-noise
6ratio (SNR) for each link at time instant t is given by
Eht,xt
[
||
√
ρA1,thtxt||2
]
= ρA1,t
Egt,xt
[
||
√
ρA2,tgtxt||2
]
= ρA2,t .
For ease of exposition, we denote St =
[
ht
gt
]
as the channel state matrix and St−1 = {S1, . . . ,St−1}
captures the collection of channel state matrices over the past (t−1) symbols, respectively, where S0 = ∅.
We assume that, at each time instant t, the channel state matrix St is full rank almost surely. Furthermore,
at each time instant t, the past states of the channel matrix St−1 are known to all nodes. However, the
instantaneous states ht and gt are known only to receiver 1, and receiver 2, respectively.
Definition 1: A code for the Gaussian two-user (2, 1, 1)–MISO broadcast channel with delayed CSIT
and alternating topology consists of sequence of stochastic encoders at the transmitter,
{ϕt : W1×W2×St−1 −→ X1 × X2}nt=1 (3)
where the messages W1 and W2 are drawn uniformly over the sets W1 and W2 respectively; and two
decoding functions at receivers
ψ1 : Yn×Sn−1×Hn −→ Wˆ1
ψ2 : Zn×Sn−1×Gn −→ Wˆ2. (4)
Definition 2: A rate pair (R1(A1, ρ), R2(A2, ρ)) is said to be achievable if there exists a sequence of
codes such that
lim sup
n→∞
Pr{Wˆi 6= Wi} = 0, ∀ i ∈ {1, 2}. (5)
Definition 3: A GSDoF pair (d1(A1), d2(A2)) is said to be achievable if there exists a sequence of
codes satisfying following
1) Reliability condition:
lim sup
n→∞
Pr{Wˆi 6= Wi} = 0, ∀ i ∈ {1, 2}, (6)
2) Perfect secrecy condition:1
lim sup
n→∞
I(W2; y
n,Sn)
n
= 0, (7)
lim sup
n→∞
I(W1; z
n,Sn)
n
= 0, (8)
1For convenience, with a slight abuse in notations, we replace Sn := (Sn−1,hn), Sn := (Sn−1,gn) in (7) and (8), respectively.
73) and communication rate condition:
lim
ρ→∞
lim inf
n→∞
log |Wi(n, ρ,Ai)|
n log ρ
≥ di(Ai), ∀ i ∈ {1, 2}. (9)
III. GSDOF OF MISO WIRETAP CHANNEL WITH DELAYED CSIT
In this section, we investigate the GSDoF of the MISO wiretap channel with delayed CSIT. Before
proceeding to state the results, we first digress to provide a useful lemma which we will repetitively use
in this work.
Lemma 1: For the Gaussian MISO channel in (2), following inequalities hold
h(yn, zn|Sn)≤˙2h(zn|Sn) + nλ1α(1− α) log(ρ), (10a)
h(yn, zn|Sn)≤˙2h(yn|Sn) + nλα1(1− α) log(ρ), (10b)
h(yn|Sn)≤˙2h(zn|Sn) + nλ1α(1− α) log(ρ), (10c)
h(zn|Sn)≤˙2h(yn|Sn) + nλα1(1− α) log(ρ). (10d)
Proof: The proof of Lemma 1 appears in Appendix I. The inequalities in Lemma 1 also hold with
additional conditioning over message W .
A. Upper Bound
We now establish an upper bound on the GSDoF of the MISO wiretap channel with delayed CSIT and
alternating topology.
Theorem 1: For the (2, 1, 1)–MISO wiretap channel with delayed CSIT and alternating topology
(λA1A2), an upper bound on GSDoF is given by
d(λA1A2) ≤
(3− α)λ1α + 2(λ11 + αλαα) + (1 + α)λα1
3
. (11)
Proof: The proof of Theorem 1 appears in Appendix II.
B. Coding schemes with fixed topology
Next, we provide some encoding schemes for fixed topology states. For simplicity of analysis and in
accordance with DoF framework, in this work we neglect the additive Gaussian noise and only mention
the asymptotic behavior of the inputs by ignoring the exact power allocations.
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Fig. 2. Received power levels at receiver 1 and receiver 2.
1) Fixed Topology (λ1α = 1): We now focus our attention on the case in which receiver 1 (legitimate
receiver) is stronger than receiver 2 (eavesdropper), comparatively and state a lower bound on GSDoF.
From practical viewpoint, this case may be useful to model a setting in which the legitimate receiver
is geographically located at a more favorable position compared to the eavesdropper, and observes less
interference from an external interferer (jammer) as opposed to the eavesdropper.
Proposition 1: The GSDoF of (2, 1, 1)–MISO wiretap channel with delayed CSIT and fixed topology
(λ1α = 1) is given by
2
3
≤ d ≤ 1− α
3
. (12)
Proof: The upper bound follows immediately from the bound established in Theorem 1 by setting
λ1α := 1 in (11). We now provide the description of the encoding scheme that we use to prove the lower
bound in Proposition 1. The coding scheme in this case is an adaptation of the scheme developed by [32],
and, so we outline it briefly. In this scheme, the transmitter sends two symbols (v1, v2) to receiver 1 and
wishes to conceal them from receiver 2. The coding scheme consists of three time slots. In the first time
slot the transmitter injects uncoded Gaussian noise (u := [u1, u2]T ) from both antennas. Note that, due
to the topology of the network, the channel output at receiver 2 (eavesdropper) is available at a lower
power level compared to the receiver 1 as shown in Figure 2. The channel output at the receiver 1 can
be interpreted as a secret key that helps to secure the confidential messages in the next timeslot. At the
end of timeslot 1, by means of past CSI the transmitter can learn the channel output at receiver 1 and
9sends it with confidential symbols (v := [v1, v2]T ) intended for receiver 1. At the end of second timeslot,
receiver 1 gets the confidential symbols embedded in with secret key (h1u). Since it knows the CSI and
h1u, it subtracts out the contribution of h1u from the channel output at the end of second timeslot to
get one equation with two variables and requires one extra equation to decode the confidential symbols,
which is being available as side information at receiver 2. By means of past CSI, the transmitter can
construct the channel output at receiver 2 in timeslot 2 and in the third time slot sends it to the receiver
1, that helps to decode the two symbols securely.
Remark 1: It can be easily seen from (12) that the lower and upper bounds do not coincide in general.
However, for a special class of channels where the channel coefficients belong to h,g ∈ Z1×2, we show
that by combining some elements of this scheme with compute-and-forward scheme [36] the bounds
agree and GSDoF is characterized. The special case will be discussed in Section V.
2) Fixed Topology (λα1 = 1): This setting refers to the case in which link connecting transmitter-to-
legitimate receiver is statistically weaker than to the eavesdropper, for which 2α/3 SDoF is achievable.
The coding scheme follows along similar lines as in Proposition 1 and is omitted.
IV. GSDOF OF MISO BROADCAST CHANNEL WITH DELAYED CSIT
Next, we extend the MISO wiretap channel model to the two-user broadcast setting and establish
bounds on GSDoF region.
A. Outer Bound
The following theorem provides an outer bound on the GSDoF region of the MISO broadcast channel
with delayed CSIT.
Theorem 2: For the (2, 1, 1)–MISO broadcast channel with delayed CSIT and alternating topology
(λA1A2), an outer bound on GSDoF region CGSDoF(λA1A2) is given by the set of all non-negative pairs
(d1, d2) satisfying
3d1 + d2 ≤ (3− α)λ1α + 2(λ11 + αλαα) + (1 + α)λα1 (13a)
d1 + 3d2 ≤ (3− α)λα1 + 2(λ11 + αλαα) + (1 + α)λ1α. (13b)
Proof: The proof of Theorem 2 appears in Appendix III.
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Timeslot 1 2 3 4
x u [v1 v2]
T + L1(u) [w1 w2]
T +M1(u)
L3(w1, w2,M1(u))
+M2(v1, v2, L1(u))
Rx1 y1 =
√
ρL1(u) y2 =
√
ρL2(v1, v2, L1(u)) y3 =
√
ρL3(w1, w2,M1(u))
y4 =
√
ρL3(w1, w2,M1(u))
+
√
ρM2(v1, v2, L1(u))
Rx2 z1 =
√
ραM1(u) z2 =
√
ραM2(v1, v2, L1(u)) z3 =
√
ραM3(w1, w2,M1(u))
z4 =
√
ραL3(w1, w2,M1(u)
+
√
ραM2(v1, v2, L1(u))
TABLE I
YANG et al. SCHEME FOR FIXED TOPOLOGY (λ1α = 1).
B. Coding schemes with fixed topology
We now consider the (2, 1, 1)–MISO broadcast channel with fixed topology (λ1α = 1 or λα1 = 1), where
one receiver is comparatively stronger than other. For sake of completeness, before providing the inner
bound, we first revisit the scheme developed by Yang et al. [32, section V-B] for the model without
topology consideration (A1t, A2t) = (1, 1) to the fixed topology setting, i.e., (A1t, A2t) = (1, α), ∀ t.
A trivial inner bound on the GSDoF region CGSDoF(λA1A2) of the two-user (2, 1, 1)–MISO broadcast
channel with fixed topology (λ1α = 1) is given by the set of all non-negative pairs (d1, d2) satisfying
3αd1 + d2 ≤ 2α (14a)
αd1 + 3d2 ≤ 2α. (14b)
The achievable GSDoF region is given by the corner points (0, 2α/3), (2/3, 0), and the point (1/2, α/2)
obtained by the intersection of line equations in (14). The corner points (2/3, 0) and (0, 2α/3) are readily
achievable by using the coding scheme as in Sections III-B1 and III-B2, since the model reduces to the
equivalent (2, 1, 1)–MISO wiretap channel — where the transmitter wants to send confidential message
to one receiver and wishes to conceal it from the unintended receiver. We now give a sketch of the
transmission scheme that is used to achieve the point (1/2, α/2). In this scheme, transmitter wants to
transmit two symbols (v := [v1, v2]T ) to receiver 1 and wishes to conceal them from receiver 2; and two
symbols (w := [w1, w2]T ) to receiver 2 and wishes to conceal them from receiver 1. The communication
takes place in four phases, each comprising of only one timeslot. The encoding scheme is concisely
shown in Table I. In the first timeslot the transmitter injects artificial noise (u := [u1, u2]T ), where each
11
receiver gets a linear combination of artificial noise denoted by L1(u) and M1(u) but with different
power levels, respectively. Due to the availability of strictly causal or delayed CSI, at the end of time
slot 1 the transmitter can learn the channel output at both receivers and in the second timeslot transmits
fresh information (v := [v1, v2]T ) to receiver 1 along with the channel output at receiver 1 in timeslot
1, y1. At the end of timeslot 2, receiver 1 requires one equation to decode the intended symbols, being
available as side information at receiver 2 (z2). In the third timeslot, transmission scheme is similar to the
one in timeslot 2 with the roles of receiver 1 and receiver 2 being reversed. In this phase, the transmitter
sends fresh information (w := [w1, w2]T ) to receiver 2 along with the past channel output at receiver
2 in timeslot 1 (z1). By means of past CSIT, at the end of third time slot the transmitter can learn the
side information at receiver 1 in timeslot 3 (y3) and at receiver 2 in timeslot 2 (z2), and sends them
in timeslot 4. At the end of fourth time slot, since receiver 1 knows the CSI, it first subtracts out the
contribution of side information y3 seen at receiver 1 from channel output y4 to get z2. Afterwards, it
removes the contribution of y1 from (y2, z2) and decodes v through channel inversion. Receiver 2 can
also perform similar operations to decode w.
The equivocation analysis of this scheme, by proceeding as in Appendix IV-5, reveals that 2 symbols
are securely transmitted over a total of four time slots yielding GSDoF of 2/4 at receiver 1. Due to
the symmetry of the problem, it can be readily shown that 2 symbols are securely send to receiver 2;
where, due to the topology of the communication model each symbol is capable of carrying only α bits,
which yields GSDoF of 2α/4 at receiver 2. In Figure 3, we plot the outer (13) and inner bounds (14)
for the two-user MISO broadcast channel with fixed topology. It can be easily seen from Figure 3 that
the bounds in (13) and (14) do not agree in general. In what follows, we provide an alternative coding
scheme which gives an improved inner bound on GSDoF region.
The following proposition gives an inner bound on the GSDoF region of the MISO broadcast channel
with fixed topology (λ1α = 1).
Proposition 2: An inner bound on the GSDoF region CGSDoF(λA1A2) of the two-user (2, 1, 1)–MISO
broadcast channel with delayed CSIT and fixed topology (λ1α = 1) is given by the set of all non-negative
pairs (d1, d2) satisfying
3(1 + α)d1 + 2d2 ≤ 2(1 + α) (15a)
α(3− α)d1 + 6d2 ≤ 4α. (15b)
Proof: The inner bound follows by generalizing the coding scheme developed in Proposition 1 for
the wiretap channel to the broadcast setting. The region in (15) is characterized by the corner points
12
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Fig. 3. Bounds on the GSDoF region of (2, 1, 1)–MISO broadcast channel, where the link to receiver 2 is weaker than to
receiver 1 (λ1α = 1).
(2/3, 0), (0, 2α/3) and the point (2/(3 + α), α(1 + α)/(3 + α)) obtained by the intersection of line
equations in (15). The achievability of the two corner points (2/3, 0) and (0, 2α/3) follow by the coding
scheme developed in Proposition 1 and in section III-B2, respectively, where the transmitter is interested
to send message to only one receiver and the other receiver acts as an eavesdropper. The achievability
of the point (2/(3 + α), α(1 + α)/(3 + α)) is provided in Appendix IV.
Remark 2: As seen in Figure 3, the outer (13) and inner (15) bounds do not meet in general; however,
it is worth noting that the encoding scheme we have established in Proposition 2 provides a larger sum
GSDoF compared to Yang et al. scheme (14), i.e.,
1 + α
2︸ ︷︷ ︸
sum GSDoF (14)
≤ 2 + α(1 + α)
3 + α︸ ︷︷ ︸
sum SDoF(15)
(16)
C. Coding scheme with symmetric alternating topology
We now turn our attention to the MISO broadcast channel with alternating topology and focus on the
symmetric case where the fractions of time spent in state λ1α and λα1 are equal. This communication
channel may model a setting in which due to the mobility of the users each receiver experiences
13
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strong interference from an external jammer half of the duration of communication time. The following
proposition provides an inner bound on GSDoF region of the MISO broadcast channel with symmetric
alternating topology (λ1α, λα1) = (12 ,
1
2).
Proposition 3: An inner bound on the GSDoF region CGSDoF(λA1A2) of the two user (2, 1, 1)–MISO
broadcast channel with delayed CSIT and symmetric alternating topology (λ1α = λα1 = 12 ) is given by
the set of all non-negative pairs (d1, d2) satisfying
6d1 + (1 + α)d2 ≤ 2(1 + α) (17a)
2(2α − 1)d1 + 3(1 + α)d2 ≤ (1 + α)2. (17b)
Proof: The inner bound follows by specializing the coding scheme that we establish for the fixed
topology setting to the alternating topology setting. As seen from Figure 4, it is sufficient to prove the
SDoF pairs (1+α3 , 0), (0,
1+α
3 ) and (
1+α
4 ,
1
2 ), since the entire region (17) can then be achieved by time
sharing. The SDoF pairs (1+α3 , 0) and (0,
1+α
3 ) are readily achievable by using the combination of coding
schemes developed in Proposition 1 and in Section III-B2, equal fractions of time. The achievability of
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the point (1+α4 ,
1
2 ) is relegated to Appendix V.
Remark 3 (Generalized sum SDoF Gains with Topological Diversity): Proposition 3 provides an in-
ner bound on the GSDoF region of MISO broadcast channel with symmetric alternating topology, where
each receiver observes a strong link half of the duration of communication time. We note that sum GSDoF
in Proposition 3 can be larger than the one obtained by a similar model but with non-diverse topology
consideration. For non-diverse topology setting, i.e., λ11, λαα, the optimal sum GSDoF is given by 1 and
α, respectively [32]. The non-diverse topology model of (λ11, λαα) = (12 , 12) is equivalent to the set-up
that we consider in Proposition 3 in the sense that the duration of communication time for stronger and
weaker links for both receivers are same. The sum GSDoF with non-diverse topology is given by
GSDoF = 1
2
× 1︸︷︷︸
sum GSDoF (A1,A2)=(1,1)
+
1
2
× α︸︷︷︸
sum GSDoF (A1,A2)=(α,α)
=
1 + α
2
≤ 3 + α
4︸ ︷︷ ︸
sum GSDoF (λ1α,λα1)=( 1
2
, 1
2
)
(18)
which is clearly smaller than the sum GSDoF of Proposition 3. This result shows the benefits of topological
diversity.
V. GSDOF (GDOF) CHARACTERIZATION IN FEW SPECIAL CASES
In this section, we study the two user Gaussian MISO broadcast channel (2) where we restrict our
attention to integer channels, i.e., h ∈ H ⊆ Z1×2 and g ∈ G ⊆∈ Z1×2. 2 In what follows, we construct
some elemental encoding schemes which characterize the (sum) GSDoF for various topology states.
A. Wiretap channel with Fixed Topology (λ1α = 1)
We first consider the MISO wiretap channel with fixed topology state (λ1α = 1) and establish the
optimal GSDoF.
Proposition 4: The GSDoF of (2, 1, 1)–MISO wiretap channel with delayed CSIT and fixed topology
state (λ1α = 1) is given by
d = 1− α
3
. (19)
Proof: The encoding scheme uses some elements from the compute-and-forward scheme in [36]
2The results established for the integer channels can be readily extended to hold for complex channels using standard
techniques [36], [37].
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and the one in Proposition 1. In this scheme the transmitter wants to send three symbols (v1, v2, v3) to
receiver 1 (legitimate receiver) and wishes to conceal them from receiver 2. The coding scheme consists
of three phases, each comprising of only one timeslot. In the first phase, the leverage provided by the
topology of the network is utilized as follows. The transmitter injects artificial noise from both antennas,
where the output at the receiver 2 is obtained at a lower power level (O(ρα)) compared to the legitimate
receiver (O(ρ)). Thus, by reducing the transmission power of the artificial noise to the order of receiver
2 (O(ρα)), the transmitter can use the remaining power (O(ρ1−α)) to send a confidential symbol to
receiver 1. The receiver 2 will receive the confidential symbol embedded in with artificial noise but at
noise floor level; and hence, can not decode it. In this phase, as opposed to the scheme in Proposition 1,
the transmitter uses structured codes to send artificial noise, where both receivers are able to compute a
unique function of artificial noise. This unique function can be interpreted as a secret key which will be
used in the next time slot to secure information. Let ui ∈ Λ, where ui denotes the noise codeword chosen
from the lattice codebook Λ, for i = 1, 2.3 Note that each transmit antenna encodes an independent stream
of noise — no coding across sub channels. After encoding, the transmitter sends structured noise (u1, u2)
3For details about lattice codes, the interested reader may refer to [36], [38].
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along with a confidential symbol v1 chosen from a Gaussian codebook as
x1 =


u1
u2

+


v1ρ
−α/2
φ

 (20)
The channel input-output relationship is given by
y1 =
√
ρh1u︸ ︷︷ ︸
O(ρ)
+
√
ρ(1−α)h11v1︸ ︷︷ ︸
O(ρ1−α)
, (21a)
z1 =
√
ραg1u︸ ︷︷ ︸
O(ρα)
+
√
ρ0g11v1︸ ︷︷ ︸
O(ρ0)
. (21b)
At the end of phase 1, each receiver conveys the past CSI to the transmitter. Figure 5 illustrates the
received power levels at receiver 1 and 2, respectively. At the end of phase 1, receiver 2 gets a linear
combination of noise codewords along with the confidential symbol v1 at noise floor level; and, thus, can
not decode it. Receiver 1 gets the confidential symbol embedded in with a linear combination of noise
codewords h1u. It first re-constructs h1u from the channel output y1 by treating v1 as noise, within
bounded noise distortion. Since
∑2
i=1 ajiui ∈ Λ where aji ∈ Z, (i, j) = {1, 2}2, the two receivers can
decode the corresponding equations (h1u, g1u) as long the computation rate [36]
Rcomp ≤ min
{
R(h1,a1 := h1), R(g1,a1 := g1)
}
(22)
where
R(h1,a1 := h1) = log
+

(||a1||2 + ρ(1−α)||h11||2 − ρ||h1a1||
1 + ρ||h1||2
)−1


R(g1,a1 := g1) = log
+

(||a1||2 − ρ
α||g1a1||
1 + ρα||g1||2
)−1


is satisfied.4 It can be readily shown from (22) that, Rcomp yields a GDoF of α. After decoding h1u, the
transmitter subtracts out the contribution of h1u from y1 and decodes v1 through channel inversion. The
information transmitted to receiver 1 via symbol v1 is given by
Rv1 = I(v1; y1|h1u)
= h(
√
ρh1u+
√
ρ(1−α)h11v1|h1u)
= (1− α) log(ρ). (23)
4In this scheme, it is sufficient if receiver 1 can only decode the linear combination of artificial noise. The condition that both
receivers decode unique key is only required for the broadcast case.
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In the second phase, the transmitter transmits fresh information (v := [v2, v3]T ) to receiver 1 along with
a linear combination of channel output (h1u) at receiver 1 during the first phase. Since the transmitter
already knows u and due to the availability of past CSI of receiver 1 (h1) in phase 1, it can easily
construct h1u and sends
x2 =


v2
v3

+


h1u
φ

 . (24)
The channel input-output relationship is given by
y2 =
√
ρh2v +
√
ρh21h1u, (25a)
z2 =
√
ραg2v +
√
ραg21h1u. (25b)
At the end of phase 2, each receiver conveys the past CSI to the transmitter. Since the receiver 1 knows
the CSI (h2) and also the channel output y1 from phase 1, it subtracts out the contribution of h1u from
the channel output y2, to obtain one equation with two unknowns (v := [v2, v3]T ). Thus, receiver 1
requires one extra equation to successfully decode the intended variables, being available as interference
(side information) at receiver 2.
In the third phase, due to the availability of delayed CSIT, the transmitter can construct the side
information z2 at receiver 2 and sends
x3 =


g2v + g21h1u
φ

 . (26)
The channel input-output relationship is given by
y3 =
√
ρh31g2v +
√
ρh31g21h1u, (27a)
z3 =
√
ραg31g2v +
√
ραg31g21h1u. (27b)
At the end of phase 3, by using y1 receiver 1 subtracts out the contribution of h1u from (y2, y3) and
decodes v through channel inversion. Thus, at the end of three timeslot, 3 symbols are transmitted to
receiver 1 which contains ((1 − α) + 2) log(ρ) bits.
Leakage Analysis. We can write the channel output at the eavesdropper in compact form as
18
z :=


√
ρ0g11
√
ραg1 0
0
√
ραg21h1
√
ρα
0
√
ραg31g21h1
√
ραg31︸ ︷︷ ︸
G ∈ Z3×3




v1
u
g2v

 . (28)
The information rate leaked to receiver 2 is bounded by
I(v1,v; z|Sn) = I(v1; z|Sn) + I(v; z|v1,Sn)
(a)
= I(v1; z1|Sn) + I(v; z|v1,Sn)
≤ o(log(ρ)) + I(g2v,u; z|v1,Sn)− I(u; z|g2v, v1,Sn)
= o(log(ρ)) + rank(G). log(ρα)− 2α log(ρ)
= o(log(ρ)) + 2α log(ρ)− 2α log(ρ)
= o(log(ρ)). (29)
where (a) follows due to the Independence of v1 and (z2, z3). From the above analysis, it can be easily
seen that 3 symbols are transmitted to receiver 1 over a total of 3 time slots, yielding 2+(1−α)3 GSDoF
at receiver 1.
Remark 4: From (29), the information leakage to the eavesdropper is
lim sup
n→∞
I(W1; z
n|Sn)
n
= o(log(ρ)). (30)
Next, we strengthen the scheme in Proposition 4 by combining it with random coding argument used in
Wyner’s wiretap coding [13] such that (8) is satisfied. We consider an equivalent n˜-block transmission
model, where the total duration of the coding scheme in Proposition 4 denotes the block length. Let
v˜ := (v1, v2, v3) denotes the input in each block, y˜ := (y1, y2, y3) denotes the channel output at receiver 1
and z˜ := (z1, z2, z3) denotes the channel output at receiver 2, where the inputs v˜ are chosen independently
from state sequence S˜. This resulting model reduces to the Wyner’s wiretap setup [13] where equivocation
rate is given by
Re = I(v˜; y˜|S˜)− I(v˜; z˜|S˜)
which satisfies the perfect secrecy criteria of
lim sup
n→∞
I(W1; z˜
n|S˜n)
n
= 0.
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It is worth noting that, by using similar arguments, we can strengthen the security of all schemes in this
work which fulfills the perfect secrecy criteria (7) and (8).
B. Coding scheme with symmetric alternating topology
The following proposition provides the sum GSDoF of the MISO broadcast channel with symmetric
alternating topology (λ1α, λα1) = (12 ,
1
2).
Proposition 5: An inner bound on the GSDoF region CGSDoF(λA1A2) of the two user (2, 1, 1)–MISO
broadcast channel with delayed CSIT and symmetric alternating topology (λ1α = λα1 = 12 ) is given by
the set of all non-negative pairs (d1, d2) satisfying
3d1 + αd2 ≤ 3 + α
2
(31a)
αd1 + 3d2 ≤ 3 + α
2
. (31b)
Proof: As shown in Figure 6, it is sufficient to prove the GSDoF pairs (3+α6 , 0), (0, 3+α6 ) and
(12 ,
1
2), since the entire region (31) can then be achieved by time sharing. The GSDoF pairs (3+α6 , 0) and
20
(0, 3+α6 ) are achievable by using the combination of coding schemes developed in Proposition 4 and in
Section III-B2, equal fractions of time. The achievability of the point (12 ,
1
2 ) is provided in Appendix V.
C. GDoF region with fixed topology
We now consider the MISO broadcast channel studied in Section IV-B with no secrecy constraints and
characterize the GDoF region. The following theorem provides the GDoF region of the MISO broadcast
channel with fixed topology (λ1α = 1).
Theorem 3: The GDoF region CGDoF(λA1A2) of the two user (2, 1, 1)–MISO broadcast channel with
delayed CSIT and fixed topology (λ1α = 1) is given by the set of all non-negative pairs (d1, d2) satisfying
d1 ≤ 1 (32a)
d2 ≤ α (32b)
2d1 + d2 ≤ 2 (32c)
d1 + 2d2 ≤ 1 + α. (32d)
Proof: The converse immediately follows from the outer bound established in [12, eq. 30-31]. As
seen in Figure 7, it suffices to prove that following GDoF pairs (0, α), (1, 0), (1−α,α) and (1− α3 , 2α3 )
are achievable. The GDoF pairs (0, α), and (1, 0) are readily achievable even without utilizing the delayed
CSI, by transmitting information to only one receiver, since the equivalent model reduces to a point-to-
point channel with two transmit antennas and a single receive antenna.
The achievability of the GDoF pair (1 − α,α) follows by sending one symbol (v) to receiver 1 and
one symbol (w) to receiver 2 as follows
x1 =


w + vρ−α/2
φ

 (33)
where E[||w||2] .= 1 and E[||v2||] .= 1. The channel input-output relationship is given by
y1 =
√
ρh11w︸ ︷︷ ︸
O(ρ)
+
√
ρ(1−α)h11v︸ ︷︷ ︸
O(ρ1−α)
, (34a)
z1 =
√
ραg11w︸ ︷︷ ︸
O(ρα)
+
√
ρ0g11v︸ ︷︷ ︸
O(ρ0)
. (34b)
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At the end of transmission, receiver 1 first re-constructs h11w from the channel output y1 by treating v
as noise, within bounded noise distortion. Afterwards, it decodes v by subtracting out the contribution
of w from y1. The information transmitted to receiver 1 via symbol v is given by
Rv1 = I(v; y1|h11w)
= (1− α) log(ρ) (35)
which yields a GDoF of 1−α at receiver 1. Using similar reasoning and algebra, it can be readily shown
that α GDoF is achievable at receiver 2.
The achievability of the point (1− α3 , 2α3 ) follows by specializing the encoding scheme that we establish
in Proposition 2 by removing the secrecy constraints. The proof of the achievability is relegated to
Appendix VII.
VI. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
In this section, we provide some numerical examples to illustrate the results presented in the previous
sections. Figure 8 shows an inner bound on the GDoF region for the MISO broadcast channel with
delayed CSIT and fixed network topology given by [12, Propostion 2]. In order to illustrate the loss
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incurred in GDoF region, we also plot the inner bound on GSDoF region of a similar model given by
Proposition 2. As we have mentioned before, albeit the optimality of the inner bound of Proposition 2
is still to be shown, the visible gap between the two regions illustrates the loss in terms of GDoF due to
secrecy constraints.
This loss is also reflected in Figure 9, where we plot the generalized sum (or total) DoF of MISO
broadcast channel and delayed CSIT with fixed and symmetric alternating network topology given by [12,
eq. (11)] and [12, eq. (12)] as a function of network topology parameter α. Figure 9 also shows the sum
GSDoF of MISO broadcast channel with fixed and symmetric alternating topology given by Proposition 2
and 3, respectively. As a reference, we also plot a lower bound on sum GSDoF obtained by straightforward
adaptation of Yang et al. scheme given by (14). It can be easily seen from the figure that, as the parameter
α approaches 1, i.e., all links have equal strength, the inner bounds in Proposition 2 and 3 recover the
sum SDoF of a similar model in the absence of network topology [32]. We note that this equivalence
also holds for models without secrecy constraints. In particular, as shown in the Figure 9 as α approaches
1, one can recover the optimal sum DoF of Maddah-Ali-Tse (MAT) scheme [3].
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we study the GSDoF of a MISO broadcast channel. We assume that perfect CSI is
available at the receivers and each receiver only conveys the past CSI to the transmitter. In addition
to this, links connecting both receivers may have unequal strength, statistically. We first consider the
MISO wiretap channel and establish bounds on GSDoF. For the case in which the legitimate receiver
is comparatively stronger than the eavesdropper, under certain conditions, the lower and upper bounds
agree, and so, we characterize the GSDoF. Next, we extend this model to the broadcast setting and
establish bounds on GSDoF region. The coding scheme is based on an appropriate extension of noise
injection scheme [32], where the transmitter utilizes the knowledge of network topology and past CSI in
a non-trivial manner. Furthermore, we specialize our result to the model with no secrecy constraints and
characterize the DoF region for the topology state in which one receiver is stronger than the other. The
results establish in this work highlight the interplay between network topology and CSI, and sheds light
on how to efficiently utilize both resources in securing information.
APPENDIX I
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Before proceeding to the proof of Lemma 1, for completeness, we first introduce a property [6, Lemma
4] which is used to establish the results in this work.
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Recall that the channel output at receiver 2 is given by
zt =
√
ρA2,tgtxt + n2t. (36)
Now, lets consider an artificial channel z˜i at receiver 2, such that the channel input-output relationship
at i-th time instant is
z˜t =
√
ρA2,t g˜txt + n˜2t (37)
where g˜t and n˜2t are independent form eachother and identically distributed as gt and n2t, respectively.
Let λgt denotes the probability distribution from which, gt and g˜t are independent and identically drawn.
Let Sn := {gt, g˜t}nt=1.
Property 1: The channel output symmetry states that
h(zt|zt−1,Sn) = h(z˜t|zt−1,Sn). (38)
Proof: We begin the proof as follows.
h(zt|zt−1,Sn) = h(zt|zt−1,gt, g˜t,Sn \ St)
= Eλgt [h(
√
ρA2,tgxt + n2t|zt−1,gt = g, g˜t,Sn \ St)]
(a)
= Eλgt [h(
√
ρA2,tgxt + n˜2t|zt−1,Sn \ St)]
(b)
= Eλgt [h(
√
ρA2,tgxt + n˜2t|zt−1, g˜t = g,gt,Sn \ St)]
(c)
= Eλgt [h(z˜t|zt−1,gt, g˜t = g,Sn \ St)]
= h(z˜t|zt−1,Sn) (39)
where (a) follows because n2t and n˜2t are independent from (xt,gt, g˜t) and have same statistics, (b)
follows since gt and g˜t belongs to λgt and have the same alphabet set; and (c) follows due to the
independence of xt and (gt, g˜t).
We now provide the proof of (10a) and (10c); due to the symmetry the rest of the inequalities follow
straightforwardly. For convenience, we first denote the channel output as
zn := (zn11, z
n
1α, z
n
α1, z
n
αα)
where znA1A2 denotes the part of channel output, when (A1, A2) ∈ {1, α}2 channel state occurs.
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We begin the proof by defining an auxiliary random variable ut, such that, given (zt, z˜t, ut,St), yt is
recovered fully. From (36) and (37), the channel outputs at receiver 2 and artificial receiver are given by


zt
z˜t

 =√ρA2,t


gt
g˜t

xt +


n2t
n˜2t

 . (40)
Then, scaling (40) with
√
ρ(A1,t−A2,t)
[ gt
ht
] [ gt
g˜t
]−1
, we get
=
√
ρA1,t


gt
ht

xt +


0
n1t


︸ ︷︷ ︸
=


φ1
yt


+
√
ρ(A1,t−A2,t)


gt
ht




gt
g˜t


−1 

n2t
n˜2t

+


0
−n1t


︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=


φ2
ut


(41)
where E[||ut||2]=˙ρ(A1,t−A2,t)+ . Then, it can be easily seen from (41) that, given Sn, by subtracting the
contribution of ut from (zt, z˜t), suffices to construct yt.
Now, we proceed as follows.
h(zn|Sn) =
n∑
t=1
h(zt|zt−1,Sn) (42)
h(zn|Sn) =
n∑
t=1
h(z˜t|zt−1,Sn) (43)
where (43) follows due to the property of channel output symmetry (38). Then, by combining (42) and
(43), we get
2h(zn|Sn) =
n∑
t=1
h(zt|zt−1,Sn) + h(z˜t|zt−1,Sn)
(d)
≥
n∑
t=1
h(zt, z˜t|zt−1,Sn)
=
n∑
t=1
h(zt, z˜t, yt, ut|zt−1,Sn)− h(yt, ut|zn, z˜t,Sn)
=
n∑
t=1
h(zt, yt|zt−1,Sn) + h(z˜t, ut|zn, yt,Sn)− h(ut|zn, z˜t,Sn)− h(yt|zn, z˜t, ut,Sn)
=
n∑
t=1
h(zt, yt|zt−1,Sn) + h(z˜t|zn, yt,Sn) + h(ut|zn, z˜t, yt,Sn)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
−h(ut|zn, z˜t,Sn)
− h(yt|zn, z˜t, ut,Sn)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
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(e)
=
n∑
t=1
h(zt, yt|zt−1,Sn) + h(z˜t|zn, yt,Sn)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=no(log(ρ))
−h(ut|zn, z˜t,Sn)
(f)
≥
n∑
t=1
h(zt, yt|zt−1,Sn)− h(ut|Sn) + no(log(ρ))
(g)
≥
n∑
t=1
h(zt, yt|zt−1, yt−1,Sn)− h(ut|Sn) + no(log(ρ))
(h)
= h(zn, yn|Sn)− h(un|Sn) + no(log(ρ))
= h(zn, yn|Sn)− h(un11, un1α, unα1, unαα|Sn) + no(log(ρ))
(i)
≥ h(zn, yn|Sn)−
∑
A1,A2∈(1,α)2
nλA1A2 log(ρ
(A1−A2)+) + no(log(ρ))
= h(zn, yn|Sn)− nλ1α(1− α) log(ρ) + no(log(ρ)) (44)
where (d), (g) and (i) follow form the fact that conditioning reduces entropy, (e) follows because yt and
ut can be fully recovered from (zt, z˜t, ut,Sn) and (zt, z˜t, yt,Sn), respectively, (f) follows because z˜t is
constructed within bounded noise distortion from (zt, yt,Sn); and, (h) follows due to the independence
of ut and ut−1.
We can also bound (44) as follows
2h(zn|Sn) + nλ1α(1− α) log(ρ) ≥ h(zn, yn|Sn) + no(log(ρ))
≥ h(yn|Sn) + no(log(ρ)). (45)
This concludes the proof.
APPENDIX II
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
We now provide the proof of Theorem 1. We begin the proof as follows.
nRe = H(W |zn,Sn)
= H(W |Sn)− I(W ; zn|Sn)
= I(W ; yn|Sn) +H(W |yn,Sn)− I(W ; zn|Sn)
(a)
≤ I(W ; yn|Sn)− I(W ; zn|Sn) + nǫn (46)
≤ I(W ; yn, zn|Sn)− I(W ; zn|Sn) + nǫn
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= h(yn, zn|Sn)− h(yn|W, zn,Sn)− h(zn|Sn) + nǫn
≤ h(yn, zn|Sn)− h(zn|Sn)− h(yn|W,xn, zn,Sn)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥no(log(ρ))
+nǫn
(b)
≤ h(zn|Sn) + nλ1α(1− α) log(ρ) + nǫn (47)
where ǫn → 0 as n→∞; (a) follows from Fano’s inequality, (b) follows because (yn) can be obtained
within noise distortion form (xn, Sn), and using (10a).
We can also bound Re as follows. From (46), we get
nRe ≤ I(W ; yn|Sn)− I(W ; zn|Sn) + nǫn
(c)
≤ h(yn|Sn)− 1
2
h(zn|W,Sn) + nλα1(1− α)
2
log(ρ)− h(zn|Sn) + h(zn|W,Sn) + nǫn
(d)
≤ h(yn|Sn)− 1
2
h(zn|Sn) + nλα1(1− α)
2
log(ρ) + nǫn (48)
where (c) follows from (10d) and (d) follows from the fact that conditioning reduces entropy.
Then combining these two upper bounds in (47) and (48), we get
nRe ≤ min
{
h(zn|Sn) + nλ1α(1− α) log(ρ), h(yn|Sn)− 1
2
h(zn|Sn) + nλα1(1− α)
2
log(ρ)
}
+ nǫn
(49)
(e)
≤ max
h(yn)
2
3
h(yn|Sn) + n(1− α)(λ1α + λα1)
3
log(ρ) + nǫn
(f)
≤ max
h(yn)
2
3
(
h(yn11|Sn) + h(yn1α|Sn) + h(ynα1|Sn) + h(ynαα|Sn)
)
+
n(1− α)(λ1α + λα1)
3
log(ρ) + nǫn
≤ (3− α)λ1α + 2(λ11 + αλαα) + (1 + α)λα1
3
n log(ρ) + nǫn (50)
where (e) follows by maximizing (49) with respect to h(zn|Sn), and (f) follows from the fact that
conditioning reduces entropy. Then, dividing both sides by n log(ρ) and taking lim ρ→∞ and limn→
∞, in (50), we get (11).
This concludes the proof.
APPENDIX III
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
The converse follows by generalizing the proof established in Theorem 1 in the context of MISO
wiretap channel with delayed CSIT and alternating topology, to the two-user MISO broadcast channel;
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and, so we outline it briefly. We begin the proof as follows.
nR1 = H(W1|W2, zn,Sn)
(a)
≤ I(W1; yn|W2,Sn)− I(W1; zn|W2,Sn) + nǫn
(b)
≤ h(zn|W2,Sn) + nλ1α(1− α) log(ρ) + nǫn (51)
where ǫn → 0 as n → ∞; (a) follows from Fano’s inequality, (b) follows by following similar steps
leading to (47) and by replacing W with W1.
We can also bound R1 as follows.
nR1 ≤ I(W1; yn|Sn)− I(W1; zn|Sn) + nǫn
(c)
≤ h(yn|Sn)− 1
2
h(zn|Sn) + nλα1(1− α)
2
log(ρ) + nǫn. (52)
where (c) follows by similar steps leading to (48) and by replacing W with W1.
Then combining these two upper bounds in (51) and (52), we get
nR1 ≤ min
{
h(zn|W2,Sn) + nλ1α(1− α) log(ρ), h(yn|Sn)− 1
2
h(zn|Sn) + nλα1(1− α)
2
log(ρ)
}
+ nǫn.
(53)
We can bound the rate R2 as follows.
nR2 = H(W2|Sn)
= I(W2; z
n|Sn) +H(W2|Sn)
(d)
≤ I(W2; zn|Sn) + nǫn
= h(zn|Sn)− h(zn|W2,Sn) + nǫn (54)
where (d) follows from Fano’s inequality.
Next, by scaling (53) with 3 and combining it with (54), we obtain
n(3R1 +R2)
≤ min{2h(zn|W2,Sn) + h(zn|Sn) + 3nλ1α(1− α) log(ρ), 3h(yn|Sn)− 1
2
h(zn|Sn)− h(zn|W2,Sn)
+
3nλα1(1− α)
2
log(ρ)} + nǫ′n
= max
β
min{β + 3nλ1α(1− α) log(ρ), 3h(yn|Sn)− β
2
+
3nλα1(1− α)
2
log(ρ)}+ nǫ′n (55)
(e)
≤ max
h(yn)
2h(yn|Sn) + n(1− α)(λ1α + λα1) log(ρ) + nǫ′n
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≤
[
(3− α)λ1α + 2(λ11 + αλαα) + (1 + α)λα1
]
n log(ρ) + nǫ′n (56)
where we define β := 2h(zn|W2,Sn) + h(zn|Sn); and (e) follows by maximizing (55) with respect to
β.
Due to the symmetry of the problem, and following similar steps leading to (56), we get
n(R1 + 3R2) ≤ max
h(zn)
2h(zn|Sn) + n(1− α)(λ1α + λα1) log(ρ) + nǫ′n (57)
(f)
≤
[
(3− α)λα1 + 2(λ11 + αλαα) + (1 + α)λ1α
]
n log(ρ) + nǫ′n (58)
where (f) follows by maximizing (57) with respect to h(zn) and due to the fact that conditioning reduces
entropy. Then, dividing both sides by n log(ρ) and taking lim ρ→∞ and limn→∞, in (56) and (58),
we get (13a) and (13b), respectively.
This concludes the proof.
APPENDIX IV
CODING SCHEME ACHIEVING
(
2
3+α ,
α(1+α)
3+α
)
GSDOF PAIR IN PROPOSITION 2
We now provide the proof of the coding scheme which gives the GSDoF pair (2/(3+α), α(1+α)/(3+
α)). The transmission scheme consists of four phases.
1) Phase 1: In this phase communication takes place in T1 channel uses, where the transmitter injects
artificial noise from both antennas. Let u := [u1, . . . ,uT1 ]T , where ut = [ut,1, ut,2]T ∀ t ∈ T1 denotes
the noise injected by the transmitter. The channel input-output relationship is given by
y1 =
√
ρh˜1u︸ ︷︷ ︸
O(ρ)
, (59a)
z1 =
√
ραg˜1u︸ ︷︷ ︸
O(ρα)
(59b)
where h˜1 = diag({ht}) ∈ CT1×2T1 , g˜1 = diag({gt}) ∈ CT1×2T1 , y1 ∈ CT1 and z1 ∈ CT1 , for t =
1, . . . , T1. At the end of phase 1, both receivers feed back the past CSI to the transmitter. By the help
of past CSI, the transmitter can learn the channel outputs at both receivers.
2) Phase 2: In this phase communication takes place in T1 channel uses. The transmitter sends fresh
symbols v := [v1, . . . ,vT1 ]T , where vt = [vt,1, vt,2]T ∀ t ∈ T1 to receiver 1 along with the past channel
output at receiver 1 in phase 1 as
x2 = v +Θ1y1 (60)
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where Θ1 ∈ C2T1×T1 is a matrix, that is assumed to be known at all nodes. The channel input-output
relationship is given by
y2 =
√
ρh˜2(v +Θ1y1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
O(ρ)
, (61a)
z2 =
√
ραg˜2(v +Θ1y1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
O(ρα)
(61b)
where h˜2 = diag({ht}) ∈ CT1×2T1 , g˜2 = diag({gt}) ∈ CT1×2T1 , y2 ∈ CT1 and z2 ∈ CT1 , for t =
1, . . . , T1. At the end of phase 2, both receivers feed back the past CSI to the transmitter. Since the
receiver 1 knows the CSI (h˜2) and the channel output at receiver 1 in phase 1 (y1), it subtracts out the
contribution of y1 from y2 to obtain T1 equations with 2T1 v-variables and requires T1 extra equations
being available as side information at receiver 2 to decode the intended variables. Notice that the side
information at receiver 2 is available at a reduced power level (O(ρα)) compared to the receiver 1.
3) Phase 3: This phase is similar to phase 2, with the roles of receiver 1 and receiver 2 being reversed.
In this phase communication takes place in T2 := αT1 channel uses. The transmitter sends confidential
symbols w := [w1, . . . ,wT2 ]T , where wt = [wt,1, wt,2]T ∀ t ∈ T2 to receiver 2 along with the past
channel output at receiver 2 as
x3 = w +Θ2z1 (62)
where Θ2 ∈ C2T2×T1 is a matrix, that is assumed to be known at all nodes. The channel input-output
relationship is given by
y3 =
√
ρh˜3(w +Θ2z1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
O(ρ)
, (63a)
z3 =
√
ραg˜3(w +Θ2z1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
O(ρα)
(63b)
where h˜3 = diag({ht}) ∈ CT2×2T2 , g˜3 = diag({gt}) ∈ CT2×2T2 , y3 ∈ CT2 and z3 ∈ CT2 , for t =
1, . . . , T2. At the end of phase 3, both receivers feed back the past CSI to the transmitter. Since the
receiver 2 knows the CSI (g˜3) and the channel output at receiver 1 in phase 1 (z1), it subtracts out the
contribution of z1 from z3 to obtain T2 equations with 2T2 w-variables and requires T2 equations being
available as side information at receiver 1 — however at a higher power level (O(ρ)) compared to the
receiver 2.
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4) Phase 4: At the end of phase 3, receiver 1 requires side information (z2) at receiver 2 in phase 2
and receiver 2 requires side information (y3) at receiver 1 in phase 3 to successfully decode the intended
variables. The transmitter can easily learn them by means of past CSI; and, the goal of this phase is to
communicate these side informations for interference alignment a`-la MAT scheme [3]. The key ingredients
of the transmission scheme are, 1) by opposition to classical MAT scheme where side information is
conveyed in an analog manner, digitized side information is multicasted, and 2) transmission of fresh
information to receiver 1. Recall that, at the end of phase 3, the side information at receiver 2 in phase
2 is available at a reduced power level O(ρα) compared to the side information at receiver 1 O(ρ) in
phase 3. After learning the side information, the transmitter perform following operations — it quantizes
the channel output at receiver 2 (z2) into αT1 log(ρ) + o(log ρ) bits within bounded noise distortion.
A similar operation is performed at the receiver 1 channel output in phase 3 — the transmitter first
generates (y′3 := Ψ1y3) where Ψ1 ∈ CT1×T2 and is assumed to be known everywhere, and quantize it
to T2 log(ρ) + o(log ρ) bits within bounded noise distortion. Since T2 := αT1, the transmitter performs
a bit wise XOR operation to generate αT1 log(ρ) + o(log ρ) bits which are then mapped to a common
message {ct} where ct ∈ C = {1, . . . , ρα} ∀ t ∈ T1 and transmits it with fresh information (vt,3) for
receiver 1 as
xt,4 =


ct + vt,3ρ
−α/2
φ

 (64)
where E[||vt,3||2] .= 1 and E[||ct||2] .= 1, ∀ t ∈ T1. At the end of phase 4, the channel input-output
relationship is given by
y4 =
√
ρh41c︸ ︷︷ ︸
O(ρ)
+
√
ρ(1−α)h41v3︸ ︷︷ ︸
O(ρ1−α)
(65a)
z4 =
√
ραg41c︸ ︷︷ ︸
O(ρ)
+
√
ρ0g41v3︸ ︷︷ ︸
O(ρ0)
(65b)
where h41 = diag({ht}) ∈ CT1×T1 , g41 = diag({gt}) ∈ CT1×T1 , c = [c1, . . . , cT1 ]T , v3 =
[v1,3, . . . , vT1,3]
T
, y4 ∈ CT1 and z4 ∈ CT1 , for t = 1, . . . , T1. At the end of phase 4, receiver 2 gets the
confidential symbols v3 intended for receiver 1 at noise floor level and is unable to decode it. Receiver
1 first constructs h41c from the channel output y4 by treating v3 as noise, and, afterwards can easily
decode v3. Through straightforward algebra, it can be readily shown that (1−α)T1 log(ρ) bits are securely
conveyed by symbol v3 to receiver 1. By using c, both receivers can learn the side information required
to decode the intended symbols as follows. After decoding c receiver 1 performs following operations —
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1) since the receiver 1 knows y3 and Ψ1, it first performs XOR operation between the quantized version
of y′3 and c to recover the side information (z2) within bounded noise distortion, and then 2) it subtracts
out the contribution of y1 from (y2, z2) to decode v through channel inversion. Due to the symmetry of
the problem receiver 2 can also perform similar operations to first recover side information y3 and from
(z3,y3) decodes w through channel inversion.
5) Equivocation Analysis: We can write the channel input-output relationship as
y :=


√
ρh˜2
√
ρh˜2Θ1 0 0
√
ραh41g˜2
√
ραh41g˜2Θ1
√
ρh41Ψ1
√
ρ1−αh˜41
0
√
ρIT1 0 0
0 0
√
ρIT2 0


︸ ︷︷ ︸
H∈C3T1+T2×4T1+T2


v
h˜1u
h˜3w + h˜3Θ2g˜1u
v3


, (66)
z :=


0
√
ραIT1 0 0
0 0
√
ραIT1 0
√
ραg3
√
ραg3Θ2 0 0
√
ρg41Ψ1h˜3
√
ρg41Ψ1h˜3Θ2
√
ραg41
√
ρ0g41


︸ ︷︷ ︸
G∈C3T1+T2×3T1+2T2


w
g˜1u
g˜2v + g˜2Θ1h1u
v3


. (67)
The information rate to receiver 1 is bounded by
I(v,v3;y|Sn) = I(v,v3;y1,y3|Sn) + I(v;y2,y4|v3,y1,y3,Sn) + I(v3;y2,y4|y1,y3,Sn)
(a)
= I(v;y2,y4|v3,y1,y3,Sn) + (1− α)T1 log(ρ)
= (1 + α)T1 log(ρ) + (1− α)T1 log(ρ) (68)
where (a) follows due to the independence of (v,v3) and (y1, y3).
We can bound the information leakage to receiver 2 as
I(v,v3; z|w,Sn) = I(v; z|v3,w,Sn) + I(v3; z|w,Sn)︸ ︷︷ ︸
o(log(ρ))
≤ I(g˜2v,u; z|v3,w,Sn)− I(u; z|g˜2v,v3,w,Sn) + o(log(ρ))
≤ I(g˜2v + g˜2Θ1h1u,u; z|v3,w,Sn)− I(u; z|g˜2v,v3,w,Sn) + o(log(ρ))
(b)
= 2αT1 log(ρ)− 2αT1 log(ρ) + o(log(ρ))
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= o(log(ρ)) (69)
where (b) follows from [32, Lemma 2].
From the analysis above, it can be readily seen that (1 + α)T1 log(ρ) bits are securely send by v; and
(1 − α)T1 log(ρ) bits are securely send by v3, to receiver 1 over a total of 3T1 + T2 = (3 + α)T1 time
slots, yielding d1 = 23+α GSDoF at receiver 1. Similar analysis shows that (1 + α)T2 log (ρ) bits are
securely transmitted via w to receiver 2 over a total of (3+α)T1 time slots, yielding d2 = α(1+α)3+α GSDoF
at receiver 2.
This concludes the proof.
APPENDIX V
CODING SCHEME ACHIEVING (1+α4 ,
1
2) SDOF PAIR IN PROPOSITION 3
In this coding scheme communication takes place in four phases, each consisting of only one time
slot. The transmitter alternate between different states and uses λ1α state at t = 1, 2, and λα1 state at
t = 3, 4, respectively. In this scheme, transmitter wants to send two symbols (v1, v2) to receiver 1 that
are meant to be kept secret from receiver 2 and three symbols (w1, w2, w3) to receiver 2 that are meant
to be kept secret from receiver 1.
In the first and second phase, topology state λ1α occurs. The transmission scheme in this case is similar
to that in phase 1 and 2 of the coding scheme of Appendix IV. The channel inputs-outputs relationship at
receiver 1 (y1, y2) and receiver 2 (z1, z2) are given by (59a), (61a) and (59b), (61b), respectively, where
T1 := 1 and Θ1 := [1, 0]T . Figure 11 illustrates the power levels at both receivers. In the third phase, the
transmitter switches to λα1 topology state. Recall that, in this state receiver 2 is comparatively stronger
than receiver 1. The transmission scheme in this phase follows by reversing the roles of receiver 1 and
2, respectively. In this phase, transmitter sends fresh information (w := [w1, w2]T ) to receiver 2 along
with a linear combination of channel output (g1u) at receiver 2 during the first phase, i.e.,
x3 =


w1
w2

+


g1u
φ

 . (70)
The channel input-output relationship is given by
y3 =
√
ρα(h3w + h31g1u) (71a)
z3 =
√
ρ(g3w + g31g1u). (71b)
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Fig. 10. Received power levels at receiver 1 and receiver 2 with alternating topology (λ1α, λα1) := ( 12 ,
1
2
).
At the end of phase 3, receiver 2 gets the confidential symbols (w := [w1, w2]T ) embedded in with
artificial noise. Since receiver 2 knows the CSI (g3), and also the channel output z1 from phase 1, it
subtracts out the contribution of z1 from the channel output z3, to obtain one equation with two unknowns
(w := [w1, w2]T ) and requires one extra equation to successfully decode the intended variables being
available as side information at receiver 1. This equation is conveyed by the transmitter to receiver 2 in
phase 4.
In phase 4, the channel remains in λα1 topology state. At the end of phase 3, receiver 1 requires
side information z2 at receiver 2 in phase 2 and receiver 2 requires side information y3 at receiver 1 in
phase 3 to successfully decode the intended variables. Notice that the side information available at the
unintended receivers are available at reduced power levels (O(ρα)). In this phase, after learning (y3, z2),
transmitter first generates a new symbol s := y3 + z2 where E[||s||2] = O(ρα). Afterwards, it quantizes
s = sˆ+∆, where ∆ is the quantization error, sˆ is the quantized value and contains
Rsˆ= I(s; sˆ)
(a)≈α log(ρ) bits (72)
where (a) follows because the quantization error E[∆2] = E[||sˆ − s||2] is bounded and does not scale
asymptotically with log(ρ). The transmitter then maps the quantization index sˆ to a common symbol c
using a Gaussian codebook, where c ∈ C = {1, . . . , ρα}, and transmits it with fresh information (w3) for
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receiver 2 as
x4 =


c+ w3ρ
−α/2
φ

 (73)
where E[||w3||2] .= 1 and E[||c||2] .= 1. At the end of phase 4, the channel input-output relationship is
given by
y4 =
√
ραh41c︸ ︷︷ ︸
O(ρα)
+
√
ρ0h41w3︸ ︷︷ ︸
O(ρ0)
(74a)
z4 =
√
ρg41c︸ ︷︷ ︸
O(ρ)
+
√
ρ(1−α)g41w3︸ ︷︷ ︸
O(ρ1−α)
. (74b)
At the end of phase 4, receiver 1 gets the confidential symbol w3 intended for receiver 2 at noise floor
level and is unable to decode it. Receiver 2 can easily reconstruct c and subtracts out its contribution
from z4 to decode the confidential symbol w3 through channel inversion. Subsequently, by using c and
following steps as mentioned before in subsection IV-4, receiver 1 can learn the side information z2 and
receiver 2 can learn the side information y3. Thus, with the help of (y1, y2, z2) receiver 1 can successfully
decodes the symbols (v1, v2) that are intended to it. By using the side information y3 and the channel
outputs (z1, z3), receiver 2 decodes the intended variables (w1, w2).
Following steps similar to in Appendix IV-5, it can be readily seen that (1+α) log(ρ) bits are securely
transmitted to receiver 1 via v over a total of 4 time slots, yielding d1 = 1+α4 SDoF at receiver 1. Due
to the symmetry of the problem, it can be readily shown that (1 +α+1−α) log(ρ) bits are transmitted
securely to receiver 2 over a total of 4 time slots, yielding d2 = 12 SDoF at receiver 2.
This concludes the proof.
APPENDIX VI
CODING SCHEME ACHIEVING (12 ,
1
2) SDOF PAIR IN PROPOSITION 5
The transmission scheme in this case is similar to the one in Proposition 2 and Proposition 4, so we
outline it briefly. The communication takes place in four phases, each consisting of only one time slot.
In this scheme the transmitter alternate between different states and uses λ1α state at t = 1, 2, and λα1
state at t = 3, 4, respectively. The transmitter wants to send three symbols (v1, v2, v3) to receiver 1 that
are meant to be kept secret from receiver 1 and three symbols (w1, w2, w3) to receiver 2 that are meant
to be kept secret from receiver 1. In the first phase, by utilizing the leverage due to the topology of the
network, transmitter injects structured noise (see Proposition 4 for details) and a confidential symbol v1
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Fig. 11. Received power levels at receiver 1 and receiver 2 with alternating topology (λ1α, λα1) := ( 1
2
, 1
2
).
to receiver 1. Figure 11 illustrates the power levels at both receivers. The untended receiver obtains v1
below noise floor level and is thus unable to decode it. The rest of the steps in the coding scheme are
similar to in Appendix IV and is omitted. Thus, at the end of four timeslot (1−α) log(ρ) bits are securely
send by v1 and (1+α) log(ρ) bits are securely conveyed by v := [v2, v3]T over a total of four time slots
yielding d1 = 12 . Due to the symmetry of the problem the receiver 2 yields a GSDoF of d2 =
1
2 .
This concludes the proof.
APPENDIX VII
CODING SCHEME ACHIEVING (1− α3 , 2α3 ) DOF PAIR IN THEOREM 3
In this scheme transmitter wants to send five symbols (v1, v2, v3, v4, v5) to receiver 1 and two symbols
(w1, w2) to receiver 2, respectively. The transmission scheme consists of four timeslot. In the first time
slot the transmitter sends three symbols to receiver 1 as follows. By utilizing the topology of the network,
the transmitter sends two symbols v := [v1, v2]T at the power level of (O(ρα)) and uses the remaining
power to send a new symbol v3 to receiver 1. As said before in Proposition 4, the two symbols v are
chosen from a lattice codebook while symbol v3 is selected from a Gaussian codebook. More specifically,
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the transmitter sends
x1 =


v1
v2

+


v3ρ
−α/2
φ

 . (75)
The channel input-output relationship in terms of power levels is illustrated in Figure 12. In the second
timeslot, the transmitter sends fresh symbols w := [w1, w2]T to receiver 2 chosen from a lattice codebook
along with a new symbol v4 to receiver 1 — selected from a Gaussian codebook, as follows
x2 =


w1
w2

+


v4ρ
−α/2
φ

 . (76)
At the end of the second time slot, the receiver 1 can easily construct h1v and h2w, respectively; and,
subsequently decodes v3 and v4, where each symbol contains (1− α) log (ρ) bits. At the end of second
timeslot, receiver 1 requires the channel output at receiver 1 in time slot 1 and receiver 2 requires the part
of channel output at receiver 1 in timeslot 2 to decode the intended symbols. Due to the availability of
delayed CSI, the transmitter can learn the side informations (g1v,h2w) and in the third timeslot sends a
linear combination of them along with a fresh symbol for receiver 1. Note that, since linear combination
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of g1v and h2w is also a lattice point, so the transmitter first constructs c := g1v + h2w and sends
x3 =


c
φ

+


v5ρ
−α/2
φ

 . (77)
At the end of third timeslot, receiver 1 can first compute c and then by subtracting the contribution of
c from y3 decodes v5. Afterwards, from c it recovers g1v, and with the help of (g1v,h1v) receiver
1 decodes v through channel inversion. Due to the symmetry of problem receiver 2 can also perform
similar operations to decode w. At the end of transmission, (2α) log(ρ) bits are send by v := [v1, v2]
and (1−α) log(ρ) bits are send by each symbol v3, v4 and v5 to receiver 1, respectively, over a total of
three time slots yielding a DoF of 1− α3 at receiver 1. Similarly, (2α) log(ρ) bits are send to receiver 2
via w := [w1, w2] over a total of 3 timeslots yielding a DoF of 2α/3 at receiver 2.
This concludes the proof.
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